How did Imran Khan's relationship with Pakistan's establishment break down?

The short answer

Imran Khan’s relationship with Pakistan’s military establishment changed from apparent alignment to open conflict. The public record supports three conclusions. First, PTI had real electoral support but rose in a political environment that independent observers and journalists described as uneven for its principal rivals. Second, Khan and General Qamar Javed Bajwa operated in an unusually close civilian–military arrangement while it served both sides. Third, Khan was constitutionally removed by Parliament in April 2022 after that arrangement had broken down; neither a US-directed operation nor an Army order directing the vote has been publicly established.^[3][6]

This article uses establishment carefully. It generally means the Army’s senior command and influence associated with military and intelligence institutions. It does not mean that the Army, ISI, ISPR, civilian governments, police, Rangers, ECP and courts are one actor. Attribution follows the record.

Khan’s rise: real support in an uneven field

2013 and 2014

Official record. PTI emerged from the 2013 election as a major opposition party and formed the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa government. Khan’s 2014 Islamabad sit-in alleged election rigging and demanded Nawaz Sharif’s resignation; it did not lead to a new election.

Claim and evidence. PTI argued that the election was stolen. PML-N figures and later journalists alleged that establishment actors tolerated or supported the protest. Available public evidence establishes the protest’s political effect, but does not establish a released military plan directing it.

Conclusion. It is reasonable to say the period changed PTI’s relationship with the existing political order. It is not reasonable to state, as fact, that the Army created PTI’s 2014 movement.

The road to 2018

Official record. Panama Papers reporting led to Supreme Court proceedings and Nawaz Sharif’s 2017 disqualification. PTI won the largest National Assembly bloc in July 2018 and formed government with coalition partners.

What independent evidence shows. Before the vote, credible reporting and observers documented restrictions on PML-N, pressure on media, defections and an election environment that was not level. FAFEN also documented the Result Transmission System failure, although its observation did not establish that the failure changed every result.^[6]

Competing interpretation. PTI says its victory reflected public demand for accountability. The Army denied engineering the election. Both points can be partly true: Khan had a substantial base, while documented constraints on rivals gave PTI an advantage.

Conclusion. “Selected” is political language, not a judicial finding. The stronger evidence-led formulation is that PTI’s rise combined real support with a field that was materially more favourable to it than to PML-N. No public evidence establishes a single covert agreement installing Khan.

Alignment in government — and PTI’s record

Official record. Khan was prime minister from August 2018 to April 2022; Bajwa was chief of Army staff. Their government repeatedly presented civilian and military leadership as “on the same page” on security and foreign policy.

What the evidence shows. Military participation in high-level policy and economic forums, public coordination on India and Afghanistan, and the 2019 extension of Bajwa’s tenure made the relationship unusually visible. The extension was initiated by Khan’s government, scrutinised by the Supreme Court and later supported by legislation. This was not a formal transfer of constitutional power, but it was strong evidence of a hybrid political arrangement in which the military’s influence was unusually consequential.

PTI’s own record must be included. Opposition leaders faced major accountability proceedings; journalists and media organisations reported censorship, intimidation and restrictions. PTI maintained that accountability agencies and courts were acting independently. The available evidence supports serious civil-liberties concerns, but does not establish that every prosecution lacked merit.

Conclusion. PTI did not consistently oppose establishment influence while it appeared to assist PTI. That undercuts a simple account in which Khan was always the military’s civilian victim.

The breakdown: appointments, policy and political space

Official record. In October 2021 the Army announced that Lt Gen Faiz Hameed would be transferred from ISI and Lt Gen Nadeem Anjum would become director-general. Khan’s government delayed the notification and then accepted it.

Claims. Khan’s supporters interpreted the delay as resistance to an imposed choice; analysts interpreted it as a dispute over whether a civilian prime minister could influence a key security appointment. The Army gave no detailed public account of its internal reasoning.

What the evidence shows. The appointment dispute is documented and was an unusually public break. Governance problems, inflation, coalition fragility, Punjab politics, the Russia visit and differing emphasis on Western economic ties were credible contributing factors. No public record establishes one decisive private cause.

Conclusion. The Faiz Hameed dispute was strong evidence that the relationship had deteriorated. It does not by itself prove that it caused Khan’s removal.

April 2022: a parliamentary removal and an unresolved political question

Official record. Opposition parties filed a no-confidence motion. On 3 April Deputy Speaker Qasim Suri rejected it on the government’s foreign-conspiracy claim and the president dissolved the National Assembly. The Supreme Court unanimously held those steps unconstitutional, restored the Assembly and required a vote. On 10 April, 174 members voted against Khan; Shehbaz Sharif became prime minister.^[3]

PTI’s claim. Khan said the US and domestic “handlers” had engineered his removal. The cipher he cited recorded US official Donald Lu’s displeasure with Khan’s Russia visit and discussion of consequences for bilateral relations.

Government and military position. The US denied interference. Pakistan’s National Security Committee did not publicly find a conspiracy. The Army said it was neutral.

What the evidence shows. The cable is documented evidence of US displeasure and diplomatic pressure. It does not publicly establish that Washington instructed Pakistan’s opposition or that Army leadership directed the vote. The political sequence supports the interpretation that Khan had lost critical establishment support; withdrawal of support is not the same thing as proof of active orchestration.

Conclusion. Khan was removed through a constitutionally restored parliamentary vote. Public evidence does not prove the larger US-conspiracy claim or an Army order directing his removal.

Wazirabad and the escalation on the streets

Official record. Khan was shot in the leg during his march near Wazirabad on 3 November 2022. Moazzam Gondal was killed and others were injured. Naveed Ahmad, arrested soon after the attack, was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment in 2025; that establishes his criminal responsibility for the shooting, not a wider plot.^[17]

PTI’s claim. Khan accused Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, Interior Minister Rana Sanaullah and an intelligence official of involvement.

Opposing account and evidence. The named officials and ISPR denied the allegation. The public record establishes the shooting, injuries, investigation and dispute over the FIR. No final court finding publicly establishes who ordered a wider conspiracy.

Conclusion. The assassination attempt is established fact. Attribution beyond the identified attacker remains unresolved and must be stated as allegation, not fact.

Early 2023 confrontations at Zaman Park involved police tear gas and water cannon, injuries reported by police and PTI workers, and allegations of stones and incendiaries by protesters. Available reporting establishes violence and force on both sides. It does not justify treating every police action or every protester as violent without event-specific evidence.

May 9: attacks, responsibility and the response

Official record. Rangers arrested Khan at the Islamabad High Court on 9 May 2023 in the Al-Qadir Trust case. Protests followed. Public video, damage records and prosecutions establish that some participants attacked military and public sites, including Lahore’s Corps Commander’s residence, the GHQ perimeter and Radio Pakistan.

PTI’s position. PTI condemned violence and denied organising it. It says party workers were framed or collectively punished.

Government and military position. Authorities said the attacks were coordinated assaults on national-security institutions and prosecuted people under anti-terrorism and military law.

What the evidence shows. The attacks are established; it is false to describe every May 9 gathering as peaceful. At the same time, no publicly available final finding establishes that Khan personally ordered the attacks, and individual criminal responsibility cannot be inferred from party membership.

The post-May 9 response included mass arrests, detention orders, party restrictions and highly visible departures from PTI. Amnesty, HRW and HRCP documented allegations of arbitrary detention, coercion, enforced disappearance and fair-trial failures. Government maintains the measures were lawful responses to serious violence.^[8][9] The 2025 Supreme Court constitutional-bench ruling restored the legal basis for military trials of some civilians; Amnesty argues that such trials still breach fair-trial standards.^[8]

Under Asim Munir: a more direct institutional confrontation

Official record. General Asim Munir succeeded Bajwa as army chief on 29 November 2022. The May 9 response, the subsequent prosecutions and the military’s public statements occurred under his command.^[26]

Claims and limits. PTI treats the crackdown and later political restrictions as evidence that Munir’s command became the central opponent of Khan’s movement. The Army has rejected political accusations and framed its actions around attacks on military installations and institutional security. Available reporting and rights evidence establish a far sharper conflict under Munir than during the Bajwa “same page” period. They do not, without a disclosed command record or court finding, establish that Munir personally directed each arrest, election decision or prosecution.

Former ISI chief Faiz Hameed’s later case is relevant as institutional context, not proof about Khan. ISPR said that a field general court martial begun in August 2024 convicted Hameed on charges including political activity, official-secrets violations, misuse of authority and causing wrongful loss, and sentenced him to 14 years’ rigorous imprisonment in 2025.^[18] The official account does not establish Khan’s responsibility for Hameed’s alleged conduct, and association between the two is not evidence of legal complicity.

Courts, media and the changed institutional environment

The Khan conflict was also fought through information and courts. In August 2023, PEMRA directed television channels not to give airtime to named people, including journalists associated with criticism of the military or government; newsrooms also faced pressure and self-censorship concerns. This establishes a formal restriction and a documented chilling context, rather than proof that every editorial decision came from a particular security institution.^[24]

In March 2024, six Islamabad High Court judges wrote to the Supreme Judicial Council alleging interference by intelligence operatives in judicial work. The High Court record confirms the letter and its institutional purpose; it does not itself determine criminal liability or establish interference in every politically sensitive Khan case.^[23] The Constitution (Twenty-Sixth Amendment) Act 2024 then changed judicial structures and the selection process for the chief justice. Supporters presented it as constitutional reform; HRCP and the International Commission of Jurists warned that parliamentary influence could weaken judicial independence.^[22] Its relevance here is institutional: it changed the setting in which PTI’s election and custody litigation was heard. It does not prove the outcome of a particular case was predetermined.

Conclusion. Available evidence strongly supports the reality of serious attacks and the reality of serious due-process concerns in the crackdown. It does not support collective guilt, or a claim that every resignation was proven coerced.

Imprisonment: changing cases, continuing custody

Official record. Khan was first imprisoned after an August 2023 Toshakhana conviction. Subsequent decisions changed the legal position: the original Toshakhana sentence was suspended, the cipher conviction and iddat conviction were overturned, and courts granted relief in several May 9 cases.

The custody chronology explains why “acquitted” and “released” were not interchangeable. The first Toshakhana sentence was suspended in August 2023, but he remained held in the cipher case. The cipher conviction was overturned in June 2024; the iddat conviction was overturned the following month. A January 2025 conviction in the Al-Qadir Trust case and a separate Toshakhana case concerning the Bulgari jewellery set supplied new operative sentences. Relief in eight May 9 cases in 2025 likewise did not discharge those sentences.^[27]

As of 13 September 2026. Khan remains in Adiala jail because sentences in the Al-Qadir Trust and Toshakhana case concerning the Bulgari jewellery set remain operative, while appeals and other proceedings continue. This is why a list of overturned convictions alone does not explain his custody.

Claims and evidence. PTI says the cases are political. The government says the convictions resulted from judicial proceedings. The court record establishes the procedural outcomes; it does not, by itself, settle the wider political-motivation argument.

In 2026 Khan received a court-ordered medical examination at Shifa International Hospital and returned to prison. The Islamabad High Court ordered measures concerning isolation, family visits, meetings with Bushra Bibi and calls with his sons. Prison authorities said he had daytime access to a seven-cell compound. His sons allege inadequate access and declining health; the government denies mistreatment. The access dispute and court orders are documented. The family allegations are not medical findings.^[11][12][16]

The 2024 election: result, forms and limits of proof

Official record. The 8 February 2024 election took place while Khan was imprisoned. PTI lost its bat symbol after the ECP found its intra-party elections non-compliant, and PTI-backed candidates ran as independents. The official results gave those candidates the largest bloc of directly elected National Assembly seats. PML-N and PPP then assembled the coalition that formed the federal government.

What independent observers documented. FAFEN found voting and counting at observed stations largely orderly, but found Form 45 was not displayed at 29.4% of observed polling stations. It also found that the nationwide mobile/internet shutdown undermined the transparency reforms intended to improve results management.^[5] Those are documented irregularities and legitimate grounds for scrutiny; they do not automatically prove that every constituency result was manipulated.

Forms 45, 47, 48 and 49. Under the election framework, Form 45 records the polling-station count. Form 47 is the returning officer’s provisional constituency consolidation; Form 48 is final consolidation and Form 49 notifies the returned candidate.^[2][4] An ECP notification has legal force. It is not an independent forensic audit. Conversely, a Form 45 image circulated online is not self-authenticating; its source, completeness and correspondence with the official record need verification.

PTI’s national claim. PTI said its Form-45 compilation showed roughly 180 victories. Available evidence supports concern about access to forms, delay and transparency. No complete independently certified national audit establishing the claimed total was identified in this research.

Conclusion. The election produced a real, substantial PTI-backed mandate in directly elected seats under an uneven and insufficiently transparent process. The available public evidence does not support either shortcut: that official notification settles all factual questions, or that PTI’s claimed national total is proven.

NA-130: Nawaz Sharif and Yasmin Rashid

Official record. ECP declared Nawaz Sharif the winner of NA-130.

PTI’s claim. Yasmin Rashid and PTI allege manipulation. A PTI-supporting Form-45 compilation said Rashid had 99,428 votes and Sharif 78,533.

What the evidence shows. The wider election had documented result-management weaknesses, so the allegation cannot be dismissed merely because it challenges an official result. Yet this research found no complete independently authenticated station-by-station audit, ECP certification or final judicial merits decision establishing those alternate totals. Rashid’s election challenge was dismissed for procedural and jurisdictional deficiencies; she appealed.^[13][14]

Conclusion. Nawaz Sharif is the official and legally recognised winner. PTI alleges Rashid was the actual winner. Documented irregularities justify questioning and investigation, but do not independently establish a different lawful winner.

Reserved seats, protest and the present

PTI-backed winners joined the Sunni Ittehad Council to seek reserved seats. ECP and the Peshawar High Court denied the claim. A 2024 Supreme Court majority initially gave PTI relief, but a 2025 constitutional-bench review set it aside.^[7] This is established legal sequence, not proof that either political side’s broader election narrative is correct.

D-Chowk, November 2024: what can be verified

Official record. PTI called its supporters to Islamabad to demand Khan’s release and oppose the 26th Amendment. Authorities blocked routes with containers, deployed police and Rangers, and used tear gas. The government said the march breached court restrictions on entry to the Red Zone; it described its response as lawful crowd control. Police made large numbers of arrests after the clearance operation.^[10][25]

PTI’s claim. PTI said the operation used live ammunition against unarmed protesters and initially made much higher casualty claims. It also alleged that hospitals and authorities concealed the toll.

What independent reporting shows. AP reported six deaths, including four security personnel, under the police account that a vehicle rammed officers; it also reported government claims that tear gas and batons, rather than live ammunition, were used. HRCP recorded conflicting accounts, road closures, mass arrests and the broader restrictions surrounding the protest. Amnesty called for a transparent investigation into the reported lethal crackdown.^[10][25] Neither the government denial nor PTI’s casualty figures supplies an independent accounting of each death, injury or alleged shooting.

Conclusion. Serious clashes, severe restrictions on movement and assembly, and major arrests are documented. The available public evidence does not establish a final civilian death toll, prove every live-fire allegation or clear the authorities of the need for an independent inquiry. It also does not support treating the whole mobilisation as either wholly peaceful or wholly violent.

Who runs PTI, and what KP shows about authority from prison

Formal offices. As of 13 September 2026, Barrister Gohar Ali Khan is PTI’s formal chairman. Salman Akram Raja has publicly acted as secretary general, while parliamentary and provincial leaders perform roles that a jailed party founder cannot routinely perform in public.

De facto authority. Khan nonetheless continues to communicate through lawyers, family and party intermediaries, and his views have demonstrably shaped major party decisions. This is political influence rather than a separate constitutional office; it should not be confused with formal authority.

Ali Amin Gandapur was KP chief minister from 1 March 2024 until October 2025. His government combined provincial administration with PTI mobilisation and faced federal restrictions around protests and recurrent security pressures. In October 2025 Gandapur tendered resignation letters. PTI’s secretary general and the party’s official account said this followed Khan’s direction and named Muhammad Sohail Afridi as successor; the Assembly speaker’s ruling records the letters and proceeded with the election process amid disagreement over their constitutional handling.^[19][28]

Afridi took office on 15 October 2025 and remains chief minister at this cutoff.^[15] The transition is strong evidence that Khan retained practical influence over a consequential provincial appointment from prison. It does not establish that he controlled every PTI institution or that Gandapur’s departure had only one cause; the precise internal reasons remain partly political reporting and party account.

Khan’s sons and the prison-access dispute

Kasim and Sulaiman Khan, who live in the United Kingdom, became more publicly active in 2026. In a CNN interview they said they feared for their father’s health and said access had been restricted; they also used international media and cricket-linked public attention to press for contact and medical care.^[20] These are family allegations and advocacy, not independent diagnoses.

The government replied that access was regulated under prison rules and court orders, and said its records showed a call with a son on 21 March 2026. In August, the Supreme Court ordered a private-hospital examination, weekly family meetings and calls with the sons; Khan was examined at Shifa International Hospital and returned to Adiala. Authorities continued to dispute allegations of medical neglect.^[21][16] The verified point is that courts intervened on access and examination. The competing claims about isolation, eyesight and the adequacy of care remain unresolved without a public independent medical record.

As of 13 September 2026, there is no verified public framework for reconciliation between PTI and Army leadership.

What the conflict shows

This history does not support a simple story in which one side alone weakened democratic institutions. PTI benefited from an uneven pre-2018 environment and did not consistently resist coercive politics in office. Some of its supporters committed serious violence on May 9. Those facts should not be minimised.

Nor should the response be sanitised. Documented constraints on PTI, serious post-May 9 due-process concerns, military trials of civilians and failures in 2024 election transparency damaged public confidence in representative institutions. Pakistan’s unresolved question is whether political competition, protest, courts and elections can function without private bargains or coercive intervention deciding their limits.